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I. Introduction 
 
1. The concept of good faith in contacts has been making inroads into common law legal 
systems in recent years, and it has been said that jurisdictions not adopting some form of 
good faith are swimming against the tide. However, it is still questionable whether such a 
duty makes sense for all contracts; in particular, for commercial contracts between 
sophisticated parties. This paper will argue that while allowing a implication of good faith in 
contracts may be helpful in some instances, it is an unnecessary burden in cases of contracts 
among sophisticated parties such as corporations. 
 
2. To be clear, this paper is not advocating poor behavior by parties in contracting. However, 
the general idea behind imposing a duty of good faith in contracts is to ensure that parties 
essentially “play fair” in contract negotiations and/or performance. This idealistic rationale 
does not necessarily translate well into practice, especially in commercial transactions 
among companies and other sophisticated parties. Indeed:  
 
The predictability of the legal outcome of a case is more important than absolute 
justice. It is necessary in a commercial setting that businessmen at least should know 
where they stand … The last thing that we want to do is to drive business away by 
vague concepts of fairness which make judicial decisions unpredictable.
1
 
 
3. This paper will illustrate these issues through examining cases involving good faith in Asia 
and relevant jurisdictions such as the UK and Australia. Part II will provide some 
background on the concept of good faith. Part III discusses some of the realities of applying 
good faith in practice, and Part IV will use cases to illustrate the abovementioned problems. 
This paper will conclude that allowing good faith to be implied in commercial contracts 
between companies and other sophisticated parties is problematic, especially in an Asian 
context. Any steps towards allowing an implication of good faith in commercial contracts 
should thus be taken cautiously.  
 
II. Good faith as a concept 
 
4. Much ink and paper has been spent on what good faith means, exactly. Most recently, a 
court held that good faith requires acting honestly in the performance of the contract, 
meaning that “parties must not lie or otherwise knowingly mislead each other about matters 
directly linked to the performance of the contract.”2 
 
5. Courts have also defined good faith in the sense of observing reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing in the course of the transaction,
3
 or more simply by what it is not 
(i.e. not bad faith)
4
. Other definitions range from requiring reasonableness or rationality, fair 
and open dealing, to fidelity to the bargain.
5
 
                                                        
1
 Sergio Freire, “Implied Obligation of Good Faith in Contracts: Only “Vulnerable” Parties Need 
Apply” (2006) 25 ARELJ 99 at 102 (citing Roy Goode, “The Concept of “Good Faith” in English 
Law”, Centro di studi e ricerche di diritto comparato e straniero (Rome 1992), No. 2). 
2
 Bhasin v Hrynew [2014] SCC 71 (“Bhasin”) at [73]. 
3
 Ng Giap Hon v Westcomb Securities Pte Ltd [2009] 3 SLR(R) 518 (“Westcomb”) at [48] (citing 
Johan Steyn, “Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest Men” (1997) 113 
LQR 433). 
4
 Id, at [49] (citing R S Summers, “‘Good Faith’ in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions 
of the Uniform Commercial Code” (1968) 54 Va L Rev 195 (“Under this thesis, the concept of 
 3 
 
6. There is also of course the well-known definition by Carter and Peden, who have argued 
that  good faith is not an independent concept but something “already inherent in contract 
doctrines, rules and principles” and that there is therefore no reason for a term concerning 
good faith to be implied into a contract.
6
 
 
7. As it is not our goal to go into the doctrinal aspects of good faith in this paper, I will now 
move onto some practical implications of allowing good faith to be implied in commercial 
contracts. 
 
III. Good faith in practice 
 
8. It is anticipated that a few problems will arise from allowing good faith (howsoever defined) 
to be implied into commercial contracts between companies.  
 
9. The most obvious, of course is that the parties’ intentions at the time of contracting are 
subverted. Commercial contracts between companies generally reflect what the parties 
intended. These are sophisticated parties, know what they want in their contracts, and have 
good lawyers working for them to ensure this outcome. For a court to imply or impose an 
additional duty of good faith where there was no such intention at the time of contracting 
undermines the intentions of the parties as well as the certainty of defined contractual 
obligations.  
 
10. Even if it is assumed that there may indeed have been some leanings towards good faith by 
one or both parties, a finding of good faith (or lack thereof) is fact-intensive and needs to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis by the courts
7
. This is obviously inefficient and time-
consuming.  
 
11. Moreover, contextual interpretation prevents parties from predicting how contract terms and 
language will be interpreted in subsequent transactions and prevents enforcement of even 
apparently clear obligations by summary procedures.
8
 This shall be illustrated, for instance, 
in Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minster for Public Works.
9
 
 
12. It has been argued that contracts, rather than being clear expressions of the parties’ 
intentions, are merely a “rough indication” of how parties intend to effect their 
relationship.
10
 Hence “by signing contracts, parties consent not only to be bound by the 
express obligations but also to be bound by the norms of the relationship.”11 Thus, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
“good faith” is “a phrase which has no general meaning or meanings of its own, but which serves to 
exclude many heterogeneous forms of bad faith”).  
5
 Colin Liew, “A Leap of Good Faith in Singapore Contract Law” 2012 Sing. J. Legal Stud 416 at 2 
(citing various sources). 
6
 J W Carter & Elisabeth Peden, “Good Faith in Australian Contract Law” (2003) 19 JCL 155. 
7
 See e.g., Aiton Australia Pty Ltd v Transfield Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 996; Yam Seng Pte Ltd v 
International Trade Corporation Ltd [2013] EWHC 111 (QB) (“Yam Seng”); Bhasin, supra n 2. 
8
 Robert E Scott, “The Death of Contract Law” (2004) 54 U Toronto L.J. 369 at 5. 
9
 Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minster for Public Works (1992) 26 NSWLR 234 
(“Renard”). 
10
 Arlen Duke, “A Universal Duty of Good Faith: An Economic Perspective” (2007) Monash 
University L.R. (Vol 33 No 1) at 196. 
11
 Ibid. 
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argument goes, imposing an “implied duty of good faith can be seen as effecting the 
intentions and reasonable expectations of the parties.”12  
 
13. The difficulty is that in such a world, either party can claim that an apparently complete and 
integrated written contract is subject to private meanings and collateral understandings.
13
 
This undermines the very purpose of having written contracts – to have the parties’ 
expectations and requirements written down for clear understanding and performance.  
 
14. Moreover, such an interpretation of the role of contracts generally does not hold true for 
contracts involving corporations and other sophisticated parties. Indeed, such parties spend 
much time and effort on negotiating contracts that reflect the parties’ final intent and 
expectations, and address as many contingencies as the parties can think of. This shall be 
seen in the cases of Renard and GDH Ltd v Creditor Co Ltd
14
. Having to further consider 
and incorporate counterparties’ unwritten expectations and norms is an additional and 
unexpected burden in performing contracts. 
 
15. Following this line of thought, it has also been argued that Asian cultures regard the written 
contract as “tentative rather than final, unfolding rather than static, a source of guidance 
rather than determinative, and subordinate to other values – such as preserving the 
relationship, avoiding disputes, and reciprocating accommodations.”15 Even if this were true 
– and it is by no means established that this is so (witness, for instance, the number of 
disputes that have arisen over poor treatment of counterparties by Chinese companies) – 
such a cultural tendency could in fact be undermined by allowing an implication of good 
faith in contracts.  
 
16. In studies looking at the effect of the probability of contractual enforcement on the 
likelihood of continuing reciprocity and cooperation between parties, it was found that “the 
longer a group plays in [a] low enforcement environment, the strongest the preference for 
reciprocity and the higher the rate of performance of that group.”16 It was suggested that this 
was because in such environments where “[t]he norms of honesty and reciprocal fairness 
influence the decision making process,” parties will engage in a “detailed screening process 
to ensure they deal with fair individuals,” while overall fewer contracts were concluded17 
(possibly because of the difficulty of finding such fair individuals). Similarly, high 
enforcement environments were also found to promote high rates of performance, as the 
prospect of high enforcement “raises the opportunity cost of breach to a level that 
encourages performance.”18  
 
17. Conversely, in medium enforcement regimes, the results suggest that in such environments 
“reciprocity is crowded out and self-interested norms prevail” as “the decision of whether or 
not to perform contracts is made by asking whether the terms of the contract, as they will be 
                                                        
12
 Id, at 197. 
13
 Scott, supra n 8, at 5. 
14
 GDH Ltd v Creditor Co Ltd [2010] HKEC 818 (“GDH”). 
15
 HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Singapore) Ltd (trustee of Starhill Global Real Estate 
Investment Trust) v Toshin Development Singapore Pte Ltd [2012] 4 SLR 738 (“Toshin”) at [40]. 
16
 Duke, supra n 10, at 189. A low enforcement regime is defined in that article as one where it is 
difficult to enforce contracts. Id, at 189 footnote 45. For the purposes of this paper, I will narrow the 
definition of a low enforcement regime to one where it is difficult to enforce or even imply good 
faith clauses.  
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Id, at 190.  
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interpreted by the court, require performance rather than by reference to the desire to 
reciprocate.”19 And a regime of implying good faith on a case-by-case basis would be the 
quintessence of a medium enforcement regime.  
 
18. Thus it is suggested that the courts should leave the alleged Asian cultural tendency towards 
reciprocity and cooperation well alone, and let the contractual parties police themselves (and 
punish the wrongdoers by refusing to enter into contracts with them): i.e. let the low 
enforcement regime continue in this regard. This paper will discuss this issue further in the 
sections discussing Yam Seng
20
 and Toshin.
21
 
 
19. Finally, allowing good faith to be implied in contracts will increase the costs of negotiation 
and transactions, as parties deal with yet another layer of uncertainty and try to pre-empt 
being sued for breach of good faith. Parties may even have to begin considering the other 
party’s expectations and consider putting others’ interests ahead of their own. This will be 
discussed further in the analysis of GDH and Toshin, as well as Westcomb
22
 and Bhasin
23
. 
 
20. Of course, it is arguable that as parties get used to a new regime of good faith, the costs of 
negotiation and litigation will go down. However, as stated, good faith is an inherently fact-
intensive concept, reliant for instance on industry standards and expectations, see, eg, Yam 
Seng, Bhasin and Toshin, not to mention individual expectations, see, eg, Westcomb. Thus it 
is unlikely that there will be anywhere near bright-line rules and standards for determining 
good faith.  
 
21. Moreover, the reality is that contracting parties typically need specific guidance regarding 
their performance obligations.
24
 Parties will find it hard to accurately predict the behaviors 
that courts will find sufficient to satisfy the vague language of good faith, and a 
misjudgment by either side could lead to substantial liability
25
, an especial concern for 
corporations with comparatively deep pockets. They will also have to police for moral 
hazard and the potential evasion of contractual responsibilities by counterparties, as 
contracting parties have an incentive to interpret ambiguous circumstances in their favour 
when it is unclear what any party must do.
26
  
 
22. Companies will also have to review their in-house practices to consider if their normal 
business practices may potentially violate some notion of good faith when engaging in 
transactions with third-parties, as shall be seen in the discussion of Toshin. 
 
23. As parties try to pre-empt being sued for breach of amorphous standards of good faith and to 
police the other side’s actions for lack of such good faith, the cost of negotiations and other 
transactions will also increase. Parties will also increasingly seek more extensive and 
sophisticated legal advice in this regard. (This is in addition to increased costs due to courts 
engaging in an extensive factual analysis.) Indeed, with the increasing emphasis on fact-
based analysis, parties (and their lawyers) now have to play a defensive game, resulting in 
                                                        
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Yam Seng, supra n 7. 
21
 Toshin, supra n 15. 
22
 Westcomb, supra n 3. 
23
 Bhasin, supra n 2. 
24
 Scott, supra n 8, at 4. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Ibid. 
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the costly situation where “[s]tanding on one's contract now requires a full trial, with all its 
attendant costs” (emphasis in original).27 
 
IV. Cases involving the practical application of good faith 
 
24. To illustrate the above points, this paper will look at a few well-known cases involving the 
implication and interpretation of good faith in contracts between commercial parties. The 
following cases discuss certain important principles in contracting: the importance of 
implementing the parties’ intentions; the required extent of disclosure to counterparties; and 
the degree to which a party can elevate its own self-interest above others’. 
 
25. This paper will first discuss the case of Renard, and compare it with GDH. Both cases 
involved large scale projects among corporations. It will be argued that the finding of good 
faith in Renard was problematic, as it rendered toothless certain contract terms that the 
parties had agreed to at the time of contracting – in particular one party’s power to have full 
discretion in terminating the contract. In contrast, the GDH court correctly adhered to the 
letter of the signed contract.  
 
26. This paper will then discuss cases of alleged violation of good faith due to lack of 
disclosure, being Yam Seng and Toshin. It is suggested that part of the problem in Yam Seng 
was failure to conduct basic due diligence, and allowing the implication of good faith would 
encourage such problematic behavior by companies. As to Toshin, while I agree with the 
court’s holding in favour of the respondent, the court’s statements regarding good faith may 
nonetheless create conflicts between a company’s obligations in contract and its own 
internal obligations, and thereby impose unnecessary burdens in contracting.  
 
27. Finally, this paper will address Westcomb and Bhasin, and discuss what is owed by a 
company to its agents under good faith. The paper will argue that while it is not disputed 
that the counterparties could have behaved better, nonetheless Westcomb was decided 
correctly, while Bhasin should have been decided on other grounds. 
 
A. Renard vs GDH: reliance on letter of contract 
 
28. In the Australian case of Renard, a dispute between a contractor (Renard Constructions 
(ME)) and its principal (the Minister for Public Works) grew into what appears to be an 
approximately seven year arbitration and litigation odyssey. The dispute revolved around a 
show-cause clause in the parties’ contract.  
 
29. The contractor had entered into an agreement with the principal for the construction of two 
reinforced concrete pumping stations.
28
 The contractor had difficulties in fulfilling its 
obligations under the contract, partly due to its own shortcomings but partly also as a result 
of the principal’s failure to supply materials to the contractor, as required under the 
contract.
29
 The contractor asked for and received several time extensions to perform the 
work.
30
 When the principal issued the first show cause notice under the contract, the 
                                                        
27
 Id, at 5. 
28
 Renard, supra n 9, at 272. The estimated final value of the contract was $208,950. The contractor 
had also entered into another contract with the principal at the same time, but that is not in dispute 
here.  
29
 Ibid.  
30
 Id, at 238, 272. 
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contractor resolved the relevant concerns and obtained another time extension.
31
  
Nonetheless, the work was still not completed approximately 5 months after the contractual 
completion date of January 1986.
32
 Finally in May 1986, the principal once again invoked 
the show-cause clause.
33
  
 
30. At this point, the principal suffered some internal miscommunication, such that the senior 
officer was not made aware of certain issues relating to the delays (including the principal’s 
previous failure to supply parts).
34
  
 
31. At the end of May 1986, the principal exercised its power under the contract to exclude the 
contractor from the site and take over the remaining work.
35
 The contractor treated this as a 
wrongful repudiation of the contract, while the principal alleged that it was a valid exercise 
of its contractual powers.
36
  
 
32. The case turned on the interpretation of the show-cause clause (subclause 44.1) in the 
contract, which reads: 
 
If the Contractor defaults in the performance or observance of any covenant, 
condition or stipulation in the Contract or refuses or neglects to comply with any 
direction as defined in clause 23 ... the Principal may suspend payment under the 
Contract and may call upon the Contractor, by notice in writing, to show cause … 
why the powers hereinafter contained in this clause should not be exercised… 
 
If the Contractor fails … to show cause to the satisfaction of the principal why the 
powers hereinafter contained should not be exercised the principal … may --  
 
(a)  take over the whole or any part of the work remaining to be completed and 
… exclude from the site the Contractor …; or  
(b)  cancel the Contract… .37 
 
33. The claim of good faith came about when the contractor claimed that the principal’s actions 
in excluding the contractor from the worksite was lacking in the aforesaid good faith, and 
that the principal was acting unreasonably.
 38
 
  
34. The Court of Appeals decided in favour of the contractor. Priestly JA held that the powers 
conferred on the principal under subclause 44.1 were to be exercised reasonably.
39
 As this 
had not, in his opinion, occurred, he found for the contractor and allowed damages in 
quantum meruit.
40
 As to the issue of good faith, Priestly JA stated that “the kind of 
reasonableness … [he was] discussing seems to … have much in common with the notions 
                                                        
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Id, at 272. 
34
 Id, at 239-240. 
35
 Id, at 240. 
36
 Id, at 274. 
37
 Id, at 239. 
38
 Id, at 242. 
39
 Id, at 259-260. 
40
 Id, at 259-260, 271. 
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of good faith which are regarded in many [other jurisdictions] … as necessarily implied in 
many kinds of contract.”41  
 
35. However, Priestly JA’s explanation concerning reasonableness and good faith was 
problematic insofar as it denied the plain meaning of subclause 44.1. He acknowledged that 
it was “clear that the words of the clause empower the principal to give a notice to show 
cause upon any default in carrying out any requirement in the contract,” and that “for a 
completely trivial default the principal can give a notice to show cause.”42 And the analysis 
should have ended there – under the terms of the agreement, the principal had the clear right 
to cancel the contract upon any default, without need to prove reasonableness.  
 
36. However, Priestly JA decided that the analysis could not end there. Presumably of the 
school of thought that contracts are merely a “rough indication” of parties’ intentions, he 
simply decided that “no contractor in his senses would enter into a contract under which 
such a thing could happen.” 43 Thus, he held that the principal had not acted reasonably, and 
by extension in good faith, in terminating the contract.
44
 To decide otherwise, the judge 
stated, would violate the purpose of the contract, which was “to have the contract work 
completed by the contractor in accordance with the contract, in return for payment by the 
principal in accordance with the contract.”45  
 
37. The most fundamental objection to such an approach is that the contractor did in fact enter 
into the contract. And the contract, which Priestly JA himself acknowledged, indeed 
empowers the principal to ask the contractor to show cause upon any default in carrying out 
any requirement in the contract, and to cancel the contract if the reasons provided were not 
to the principal’s satisfaction.   
 
38. Granted, this was probably a contract where the power was relatively one-sided, and it was 
probably difficult for the contractor to negotiate or amend the terms of the contract. 
Nonetheless, it is not uncommon to find such clauses in contracts between companies, 
where one party has the power to sever relations at its discretion. Loan agreements, for 
instance, regularly include such statements.
46
 This was also a standard industry contract
47
, 
and the contractor must have been familiar with its terms.  
 
39. The usual way to ameliorate the effect of such clauses is through the insertion of qualifiers 
(or a side letter amending the terms of the contract). Thus, if the parties had intended to 
require reasonable behavior by the principal or a default only upon a substantial breach of a 
contract term, it would have been but the work of a moment to add in the words 
“reasonable” or “material” to the subclause.  
 
40. Thus subclause 44.1 could have been amended as follows: “[i]f the Contractor fails within 
the period specified in the notice in writing to show cause to the reasonable satisfaction of 
the principal why the powers hereinafter contained should not be exercised”, or, 
alternatively, “[i]f the Contractor materially defaults in the performance or observance of 
                                                        
41
 Id, at 263. 
42
 Id, at 258. 
43
 Ibid. (“The reasonable contractor, the reasonable principal and the reasonable looker-on would all 
assume that such a result could not come about except with good reason.”) 
44
 Id, at 258, 263. 
45
 Id, at 258. 
46
 See, eg, APLMA standard form loan agreements and home mortgage agreements.  
47
 This was a NPWC Edition 3 (1981) contract. Renard, supra n 9, at 261. 
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any covenant, condition or stipulation.” Further amendments could also have been made to 
the effect that any delay or breach which resulted from the principal’s actions or omissions 
would not constitute a default under subclause 44.1.  
 
41. None of this was done here. Instead, the contractor agreed to this contract and all its terms, 
without amendment or qualification. In fact, “[a]t all times during th[e] litigation the 
contractor has accepted that it was in default under the contract.”48  
 
42. If we follow this approach towards contracts – i.e. allow an implied term of good faith to 
modify clauses which on their face allow one party full discretion to take a specified action 
(even if such action is arguably unreasonable) – we have a problem. There are, in fact, many 
situations where a party may wish full discretion to terminate a contract, and the other party 
agrees to such a term in order to get the benefit of the contract. But under this requirement 
of “reasonableness,” it would seem that there is no way a party could enforce a condition 
allowing absolute discretion on its part, even if that was the express and mutually agreed 
intention of the parties at the time of contracting.  
 
43. Additionally, such an approach of not allowing terms based on their face value would 
increase moral hazard, as it allows counterparties to later claim that they believed that such a 
clause(s) were only to be enforced “reasonably.” Then it becomes a case of “who said what” 
and results in a costly, extensive factual analysis of the situation at the time. Far better, for 
certainty of contract and enforcement, not to mention acceptance of commercial intentions, 
to accept that a contract means exactly what it says.    
 
44. This paper also takes issue with the notion that allowing the clear meaning of such a clause 
would undermine the purpose of the contract. First, that is a simplistic interpretation of 
contract intentions. Certainly the underlying idea is to have the work completed in return for 
payment. However, as Priestly JA himself indicated, the work has to be “in accordance with 
the contract”. If, as in this case, the work was not done in time or in accordance with the 
stipulated requirements, that would also violate the purpose of the contract.   
 
45. Moreover, there can be more than one purpose of a contract. One purpose, as was stated, 
was certainly “to have the contract work completed by the contractor in accordance with the 
contract, in return for payment by the principal in accordance with the contract.”49 The other 
purposes were probably to protect the principal by ensuring that the government (as 
represented by the Minister) was not cheated; that the work was completed on time in 
accordance with the government’s requirements; and to protect the government’s reputation 
(by ensuring that the work was timely and well done).  
 
46. As Priestly JA himself pointed out, the contract was part of a standard form contract, with 
clauses which provided for situations “which experience has shown it is prudent to provide 
for in advance”50 – in this case non or poor performance. Similarly, companies in 
commercial contracts may well include such clauses in their contracts, due to past bad 
experiences. Being unable to enforce such a term would thus be an unnecessary burden in 
contracting, requiring companies to resort to more onerous and expensive methods to ensure 
that the work was done in the way required and contracted for (including perhaps increased 
supervision and numerous interim reports and inspections). 
 
                                                        
48
 Id, at 272. 
49
 Id, at 258. 
50
 Id, at 261. 
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47. The court probably had sympathy for the contractor’s position. Nonetheless, this is not a 
reason to shoe-horn in a duty of good faith, in a way that altered the expectations of the 
parties post-hoc. Priestly JA could well have found for the contractor on other grounds; for 
instance Meagher JA found for the contractor based on other well-established contract 
principles.
51
  
 
48. In contrast to the approach taken in Renard, the approach taken by the GDH courts in Hong 
Kong is straightforward and not easy to misconstrue or misapply, and without such negative 
implications for future contracts and negotiations. 
 
49. The GDH case involved a complicated cross-border transaction over a debt restructuring, 
including multiple parties from various jurisdictions as well as the Guangdong Provincial 
Government (“GPG”). As background, Guangdong Enterprise (Holdings) Ltd. (“GDE”) was 
the investment vehicle of GPG, with about 250 subsidiaries (“GDE Group”).52 One of 
GDE’s subsidiaries was GD Invest SARL (“GDI”).53 
 
50. In 1992, GDI entered into a financing agreement with certain French banks (the “French 
banks”) to finance the acquisition of a Parisian hotel; GDI’s liability under the agreement 
was guaranteed by GDE.
54
  
 
51. The GDE Group subsequently defaulted on its collective debt, including GDE’s obligations 
under the abovementioned guarantee.
55
 The creditors involved approximately 170 banks and 
bondholders, along with trade and other debtors.
56
  
 
52. The GPG, GDE Group and the creditors entered into a debt restructuring, through a Debt 
Restructuring Agreement (“DRA”). The DRA, which “was worked upon by teams of 
lawyers and financial experts, [was] a considerable document of detail and complexity.”57 It 
ran to “84 pages, 27 Schedules, and has 41 pages of signatories.”58 The negotiations took 
two years to complete, and would probably have taken longer if not for pressure from the 
GPG.
59
 In the end it was finalized “at breakneck pace,” with the claims procedure for 
contingent and unascertained claims being worked out in around 3 months’ time.60 
                                                        
51
 Id, at 276 (“the principal's mind, on the arbitrator's findings, was so distorted by prejudice and 
misinformation that he was unable to comprehend the facts in respect to which he had to pass 
judgment. Since he was unable to be "satisfied" -- and, if it matters, that inability arose solely 
through his own fault -- his action in taking over the contract and excluding the contractor lacked 
contractual justification and amounted to a repudiation”). 
52
 GDH Ltd v Creditor Co Ltd [2008] 5 HKLRD 895 (“GDH I”) at [2]. 
53
 GDH, supra n 14, at [4]. 
54
 Id, at [6] - [8]. 
55
 Id, at [9] - [10]. The debt was in the region of US$4.9 billion. It was “common ground that 
financial impropriety led to the collapse of the GDE Group, and the [GPG] feared that failure to re-
structure the Group would impact adversely upon foreign lending in China and on the Hong Kong 
banking sector; the [GPG] also was keen to avoid any investigation into the circumstances which 
had led to the collapse of the GDE Group.” Ibid. 
56
 GDH I, supra n 52, at [3]. 
57
 GDH, supra n 14, at [16]. 
58
 Ibid. 
59
 GDH I, supra n 52, at [52] (“After two years of negotiation and towards the end of October 2000, 
the GPG required that the entire restructuring be completed in the calendar year 2000 on the basis 
that the provision was in the GPG’s budget for 2000 but not for the following year”). 
60
 Id, at [5]. 
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53. The restructuring package also involved a fund pool for distribution to creditors, and the 
GPG contributed to the pool via its vehicle GDH Limited (“GDH”).61 At the time of 
negotiations, it was “envisaged that the creditors would be entitled to share pari passu” in 
the fund pool, and any creditor who failed to agree to this restructuring arrangement and the 
related claim procedure would be unable to benefit from this fund pool.
62
  
 
54. US$15.5 million notionally was also set aside from the fund pool to meet the French banks' 
claims.
63
 These banks were treated as unsecured contingent creditors and their claims 
classified as “Unrelated Guarantee Claims” (so-called because their claims were based on a 
guarantee where the guarantor GDE was a company involved in the restructuring but the 
primary obligor GDI was not).
64
  
 
55. The dispute in question arose from a side arrangement between the French banks, GDI and 
GDH. After the DRA was completed, GDH approached the French banks for “immediate 
settlement” of GDI’s obligations.65 The upshot was that GDI would to bring forward its 
purchase of the hotel from the French banks, and GDH in turn would pay a revised purchase 
price on behalf of GDI (involving an immediate payment of €3.5 million to the French 
banks).
66
 In return, the French banks agreed not to submit any claims under the DRA, even a 
“Nil Proof” claim.67 As a result of this arrangement, GPG would be able to clawback the 
US$15.5 million from the amounts set aside for the claims of the French banks, thereby 
making a saving of about US$10 million.
68
 
 
56. The other creditors obviously had something to say about this arrangement, and the fund 
custodian refused to release the US$15.5 million.
69
 GDH sued for breach of contract, and 
the custodian counterclaimed (in part) for breach of contract by the French banks.
70
  
 
57. The DRA claim process involves, in part, the following: 
 
If a holder of an Unadmitted Unsecured Restructuring Claim has not submitted a 
Proof of Claim … in accordance with the Claims Procedure on or prior to [date] the 
Restructuring Consideration transferred to Creditor Co in respect of such [claim] … 
shall be transferred to GDH and … may be distributed at the discretion of GDH to 
the Accepting Creditor with the Unadmitted Unsecured Restructuring Claim or 
otherwise applied by GDH for its own use and benefit.
71
 (emphasis in original.) 
 
                                                        
61
 GDH, supra n 14, at [12]. 
62
 Id, at [13]. 
63
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68
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69
 Id, at [28]. 
70
 Id, at [29]. 
71
 Id, at [63]. 
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58. The issue of good faith arose over whether the French banks were in fact required to submit 
a “Nil Proof” of claim under the DRA. Had they done so, the US$15.5 million would have 
stayed in the pool and been distributed to other creditors on a pari passu basis.
72
  
 
59. The creditor group claimed that the DRA obliged all creditors to “refrain from taking steps 
which would prejudice other creditors, all of whom required to be treated equally, and to act 
in good faith”; hence the French banks’ failure to file a “Nil Proof” claim under the DRA 
“was a breach of the obligations held by the banks to the other creditors”.73  
 
60. The High Court, affirmed by the Court of Appeal and Court of Final Appeal,74 found for the 
French banks and GDH, finding “no principle of good faith of general application” in Hong 
Kong law.
75
 The Court of Appeal also explained that:  
 
all that occurs in the event of the non-submission of a Proof of Claim is that the 
relevant part of the Restructuring Consideration is paid to a party different to the one 
to which it would have been paid had a Proof been filed. Thus the DRA provides for 
one consequence in one event (payment to a proving creditor in the event of a claim) 
and a different consequence in another (in the present instance payment to GDH in 
the event of no proving creditor).
76
 [emphasis added] 
 
61. In other words, the creditors got exactly what they bargained for, and could not post-hoc 
complain about the consequences. This makes perfect sense, especially from a commercial 
point of view. 
 
62. Negotiations over the restructuring had taken over two years, and would probably have gone 
on longer had not the GPG intervened. Although the claims process was only decided 
towards the end of the negotiations, nonetheless reams of lawyers had gone over the details 
of the claims process (and the lawyers’ bills were probably correspondingly high). The DRA 
itself was a 84-page document (including 27 Schedules), and had been presumably reviewed 
by at least 41 pages of signatories. If the creditors did not at any point in this spot the 
loophole in the arrangements, that was not GDH’s or the French banks’ problem.  
 
63. Obviously, the creditors felt that GDH and the banks should not have used the said loophole. 
But, as the Court of Appeal pointed out, the French banks had essentially settled with their 
primary obligor GDI, and therefore had no reason to make a claim under the DRA, 
especially since there was no requirement under the DRA to submit a “Nil Proof” claim.77 
This approach also avoids the problems with a contextual interpretation of contract, as found 
with Renard.  
 
64. The alternative approach, to allow the implication of a duty of good faith into the contract, 
would not necessarily have ended the issue in the creditors’ favour either. As a finding of 
good faith is a fact-intensive exercise, the courts would have to analyze why GDH 
approached the French banks with the proposal, and if either side had an intention to 
undercut the other creditors when they entered into the proposal, or even when they agreed 
to the terms of the DRA (including the fatal clause). As the Court of Appeal stated, “there 
                                                        
72
 Id, at [32]. 
73
 Id, at [53]. 
74
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could be entirely legitimate reasons why a putative claimant may not wish to file a Proof” – 
e.g., the claim “may have been satisfied between the signing of the DRA in December 2000 
and the deadline for the filing of a Proof of Claim by end March 2002” or a claimant may 
have been satisfied with the prospect of its debtor’s ability to ultimately repay its debt and 
did not wish to become involved with the contractual restructured debt procedure.
78
  
 
65. Moreover, had the court decided in the creditors’ favour, it would mean that parties could 
not rely on the letter of their contract, even in a highly negotiated situation such as this. 
Alluding to the creditors’ claim that GDH was obliged to treat all the creditors fairly, parties 
would also be obliged to consider and ameliorate the negative impact of their actions on 
their competitors. As a general rule, this goes against normal business principles, 
particularly when it concerns companies and sophisticated parties, and would have a 
dampening effect on commerce. In the words of Meagher JA in Renard, there is no reason 
why a commercial party should have regard to any interests except its own.
79
 
 
66. It should be further noted that such extensive negotiations are, in a sense, an exercise in 
preventing the parties from performing as the other contracting parties would not want them 
to. It is generally expected that counterparties in a contract negotiation will try to find 
loopholes, and the written contract is meant to pre-empt any such loopholes. It is not then 
for the court to renegotiate the deal for the losing party, on the grounds that one side played 
the game better than the other side(s). To do so would be to essentially punish the (winning) 
side for creating a better deal, or spotting a loophole in the transaction; essentially bringing 
transactions down to the dumbest negotiator.  
 
B. Yam Seng vs Toshin: disclosure vs diligence 
 
67. I now turn to Yam Seng and Toshin, which deal with alleged violations of good faith due to 
failure to disclose.  
 
68. In the UK case of Yam Seng, International Trade Corporation Limited (“ITC”) – controlled 
by one Roy Presswell – entered into a contract with Yam Seng Pte Ltd (“YS”) – controlled 
by one Sunil Tuni – for the (mostly) duty-free distribution of toiletries branded to show an 
association with Manchester United, in various territories including China and the Middle 
East.
80
 It later turned out that ITC did not, at the time of signing, actually possess the license 
for the manufacture and distribution of the said toiletries, despite assurances to the 
contrary.
81
 In fact, the licensing agreement was signed some months after the conclusion of 
the agreement between YS and ITC.
82
 
 
69. ITC also negotiated a separate agreement with another company (“KS”) for the domestic 
market.
83
 ITC confirmed to YS that the domestic price charged by KS was higher than the 
duty-free price required under the YS contract, when in fact ITC was aware that this was not 
so.
84
 
 
                                                        
78
 Id, at [72]. 
79
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80
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70. The relationship between YS and ITC subsequently deteriorated, and suit was filed. YS 
claimed that there was an implied term of good faith in the agreement, interpreted by the 
court as an implied duty of honesty in the provision of information by ITC, as well as an 
implied duty not to approve a domestic price for a product which undercut the duty-free 
price provided by YS.
85
 
 
71. The court, while declining to imply a general duty of good faith in all contracts at this point 
(although stressing that the English courts were swimming against the tide), decided in YS’ 
favour. It found that while ITC had not breached the latter duty (because it had no power to 
dictate the domestic price), it had in fact breached the former duty (of honesty), because 
Presswell gave YS the impression that “the domestic retail price was being increased when 
he knew that this information was false”.86 
 
72. Engaging in a discussion of good faith as obiter, the Yam Seng court stressed that an 
analysis of good faith “depends not on either party’s perception of whether particular 
conduct is improper but on whether in the particular context the conduct would be regarded 
as commercially unacceptable by reasonable and honest people.”87  
 
73. Yam Seng is an interesting case of a contract made between 2 companies who, though 
putatively sophisticated parties, yet did not act in such a manner. The court described 
Presswell as someone with a “striking ability to treat wishful thinking as fact” and other 
comments of a similar nature.
88
 The agreement was also described as “a short document … 
evidently prepared by the parties themselves without the assistance of lawyers,”89 which, 
while by itself is not an problem, does in the overall scheme of things indicate some naiveté 
about conducting business.  
 
74. But more importantly, and which was not addressed in the court’s opinion, YS appeared to 
accept ITC’s statements that it had obtained a licensing agreement from Manchester United 
without question, i.e. without asking to see the actual licensing agreement or at least obtain 
written confirmation from Manchester United concerning the existence of such an 
agreement. This violates the most basic rule in negotiations and contracts: doing your 
homework.  
 
75. Presumably if YS had ascertained that ITC did not actually have the licensing agreement in 
hand at the point of contracting, it would not have signed the distribution agreement until 
                                                        
85
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the said license was executed, and would also have treated ITC’s other statements with 
greater suspicion.
90
  
 
76. The question then becomes whether YS should be rewarded for not conducting basic due 
diligence. If YS had known it was operating in a low-enforcement regime, it would probably 
have engaged in a more “detailed screening process” to ensure that ITC could, in fact, 
deliver what it claimed it could. However, YS did not conduct basic due diligence, and got 
into trouble thereby.
91
 Illustrating the moral hazard faced by allowing implied good faith in 
contracts, YS was allowed to had to seek refuge in a medium enforcement regime, where a 
term of good faith or honesty could be implied and enforced.  
 
77. This approach, if accepted more widely, could lull companies into not doing simple due 
diligence for their deals (for instance, confirming that counterparties can deliver what they 
promise, or confirming that they are dealing with “fair” or even competent counterparties). 
This is not a trend that should be encouraged; at the very least there will be more such 
claims of lack of good faith crowding the dockets. 
 
78. On the flipside, to avoid allegations of breach of implied good faith, companies may well 
have to ensure that their counterparties did their due diligence, and make sure that they 
understood the implications of the agreed contractual terms. This would, again, go against 
normal business principles and commercial interests.  
 
79. A similar issue of disclosure (or lack thereof) was pursued in the Singapore case of Toshin. 
The underlying contract was a lease between appellant landlord HSBC Institutional Trust 
Services (Singapore) Limited and the respondent tenant, Toshin Development Singapore Pte 
Ltd.  
 
80. The lease contained a rent review mechanism (“the RRM”), which provided that the parties 
“shall in good faith endeavour to agree on the prevailing market rental value” for the 
premises in question, or, failing agreement on the rent, jointly appoint three international 
firms of licensed valuers to determine the said rental value.
92
  
 
81. The next contract renewal was due in June 2011.93 Between July 2010 and early 2011, the 
respondent unilaterally approached all eight “international firms of licensed valuers” present 
in Singapore to prepare valuation reports on the rental value of the premises as of June 2010, 
and subsequently engaged the seven firms which agreed to prepare reports (“the Toshin 
valuations”).94 
 
82. In January 2011, the parties arranged for a meeting to discuss the new rent for the upcoming 
rental term.
95
 Unable to agree on a rental value, the parties jointly issued proposal requests 
                                                        
90
 Indeed, as time went on and more and more of ITC’s promises went unfulfilled, YS’ emails to 
ITC became increasingly testy.  
91
 If ITC had taken more active steps to lie to YS, for instance by showing YS a forged licensing 
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to five valuation firms to provide valuation services under the RRM.
96
 The respondent did 
not disclose the existence of the Toshin valuations during this meeting.
97
 
 
83. The appellant subsequently discovered the existence of the Toshin valuations, and claimed 
that the respondent unfairly procured an advantage for itself.
98
 As remedy, the respondent 
provided copies of the reports from the five firms jointly chosen to provide valuations, and 
also suggested that the parties issue joint instructions to the designated valuers that they 
“shall be independent and fair to both parties and in particular shall not be bound by any 
previous valuations which they have carried out for either party.”99 The appellant was not 
appeased and brought the case to court. 
 
84. Acknowledging that there was an express term of good faith in the lease and that there was 
“no good reason why an express agreement between contracting parties that they must 
negotiate in good faith should not be upheld,”100 the court nonetheless concluded that the 
RRM remained operable and dismissed the case.
101
 The court decided that the respondent’s 
remedial actions were sufficient to cure the abovementioned issues, and further that the 
valuation firms could be relied upon to act professionally and provide independent 
reports.
102
 
 
85. This paper agrees with this analysis. It made good commercial sense for the respondent to 
undertake a pre-evaluation of the property; in fact it turns out the respondent had carried out 
such interim valuations of the property since 1993, for business forecasting purposes.
103
 It 
was also valid to assume that the valuation agents were professionals who would act 
independently in assessing the market rental value of the premises, regardless of whether 
they were appointed jointly or individually by one of the parties in the transaction.
104
 
Singapore, after all, is not that big a market, and there would inevitably be some overlap of 
agents at some point.  
 
86. It should be further noted that the appellant itself had engaged in opportunistic activity of its 
own, including proposing Savills as one of the designated valuers despite Savills having a 
close relationship with the appellant.
105
 There were no innocent parties here, as is usually 
the case in such situations.  
 
87. The real problem, according to the court, was the respondent’s concealment of its actions. 
The preferred approach, the court stated, would have been for the respondent to disclose the 
valuations at the outset of negotiations, to avoid providing an “unfair advantage that would 
afford one party a commercially-significant insight into the conduct of the negotiating 
process.”106 
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88. This is not as straightforward as stated, however. As the court noted, “[t]here is often no 
clear line between seeking an advantageous but legitimate position in business dealings and 
negotiations on the one hand, and offending the basic standards of commercial fair play on 
the other.”107 To avoid allegations of non-disclosure and lack of good faith, a company 
might have to disclose, to all counterparties, advantageous positions resulting from its own 
strong corporate governance policies or business forecasting exercises, so as to start all 
parties off on a conceptually level playing field. On the other hand, the company would also 
have to be wary of giving up so much information that it went against its own interests and 
corporate duty to maintain an advantageous position in business. Such a determination 
would require the input of internal compliance officers and business analysts, as well as 
experts and lawyers, resulting in an expensive and time-intensive exercise.  
 
89. Toshin was based upon an express term of good faith in the contract. If, however, a contract 
does not contain an express term of good faith (and this case should have scared off any 
competent company from having any such expression in their contracts), can a party still 
nonetheless be held to such standards under an implied term of good faith? Based on the 
remarks made by the Toshin court, the answer may be yes. As such, companies will have to 
be much more cautious in their approach towards negotiations and performance. Finally, 
this approach may undermine any Asian “cultural value of promoting consensus”108 as 
parties instead focus on protecting themselves against accusations of breach of good faith. 
 
C. Bhasin vs Westcomb: corporations vs their agents 
 
90. Finally, this paper will address Westcomb and Bhasin, cases involving the behavior of 
corporations with regard to their employees/agents.  
 
91. The Canadian case of Bhasin involved a dispute between respondents Canadian American 
Financial Corp (“Can-Am”) and Larry Hrynew, and appellant Harish Bhasin.  
 
92. Both Bhasin and Hrynew were successful enrollment directors for Can-Am (which markets 
education savings plans), as well as competitors: Hrynew wanted to capture Basin’s 
lucrative niche market, and had previously proposed mergers between their agencies which 
Bhasin repeatedly declined.
109
 Hrynew then approached Can-Am with a proposal that Can-
Am force a merger between Hrynew’s and Bhasin’s agencies.110  
 
93. Can-Am then “repeatedly misled” Bhasin on several counts: that Hrynew was obliged to 
treat Bhasin’s information confidentially in his role as Can-Am’s provincial trading officer 
(“PTO”) (to review enrollment directors for compliance with securities laws); that the 
Alberta Securities Commission had rejected a proposal by Can-Am to have an outside PTO; 
and “responding equivocally” when asked by Bhasin whether the proposed Hrynew-Bhasin 
merger was a “done deal”.111  
 
94. Bhasin worked for Can-Am pursuant to an enrollment director’s agreement; this included a 
renewal clause which operated automatically unless one of the parties gave 6 months’ 
written notice to the contrary.
112
 When Bhasin continued to refuse to allow Hrynew to audit 
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his records (as PTO), Can-Am threatened and then actually declined to renew his 
contract.
113
 Bhasin “lost the value in his business” at the expiration of the contract, and was 
forced to take less renumerative work with one of Can-Am’s competitors.114 Consequently, 
Bhasin sued Can-Am and Hrynew.
115
  
 
95. The Bhasin court held that Can-Am failed to act honestly with Bhasin in exercising the non-
renewal clause, and was thereby in breach of the contract.
116
 Similar to the Yam Seng court, 
the Bhasin court held that commercial parties “reasonably expect a basic level of honesty 
and good faith in contractual dealings,” hence “parties must not lie or otherwise knowingly 
mislead each other about matters directly linked to the performance of the contract.”117  
Additionally, in performing the contract “a contracting party should have appropriate regard 
to the legitimate contractual interests of the contracting partner”, with the extent of such 
regard “depending on the context of the contractual relationship.”118  
 
96. This approach is problematic and burdensome, as discussed previously. But focusing this 
discussion on the issue of what is due from companies to their agents, the question is raised: 
at which point does a company’s behavior shift from legitimately keeping confidential its 
information and acting in its own interests, to acting dishonestly or without appropriate 
regard for its agent’s (or employee’s) interests?  
 
97. Can-Am, in this case, was probably trying to keep Hrynew, a valuable agent, happy, 
especially in light of Can-Am’s difficulties with the securities commission and Hrynew’s 
“good working relationship” with the commission.119 Can-Am also probably did not want to 
disclose to Bhasin its significant problems with the securities commission (including a 
possible revocation of its license). None of these are, on their face, unreasonable actions or 
interests or illegitimate commercial concerns. It was the totality of the actions which the 
court found problematic – something which companies will have to keep in mind in their 
daily actions as well.
120
  
 
98. It is also be noted that Bhasin was also a sophisticated player in the industry, whose business 
“thrived” and who over the course of his career received multiple awards and prizes from 
Can-Am recognizing him as “one of their top enrollment directors in Canada.”121 And since 
he clearly had concerns regarding Can-Am’s and Hrynew’s behavior, it seems unlikely that 
he was completely blindsided by events. He could well have chosen to pre-empt Can-Am 
and Hrynew’s actions and “governed himself accordingly so as to retain the value in his 
agency.”122 (In fact, he was arguably in a better position to leave his contract than the 
contractor in Renard.)  
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99. Moreover, there was no argument that the plain words of the Bhasin contract did not allow 
Can-Am to refuse to renew the contract. However, similar to the concern raised by Renard 
on the inability to act in one’s absolute discretion, if the Bhasin approach was adopted more 
widely, companies in the process of renewing contracts would have to be far more cautious 
in considering non-renewal. Paper trails and “reasonable” justifications would have to be 
produced for any non-renewal or termination of contract, regardless of the company’s 
powers under the clear terms of the contract. While, of course, any prudent company should 
already be doing this, this still fundamentally negates the ability of a company to stand on 
the terms of its agreements, and undermines the certainty of contracts. 
 
100. None of this is, of course, an excuse for Can-Am’s and Hrynew’s actions. However, 
the case should properly have been pursued on other grounds (perhaps fraud and fraudulent 
misrepresentation), rather than become the basis for creating an implied duty of good faith 
in commercial contracts. 
 
101. Thus the Bhasin court’s belief that its approach was “sufficiently precise that it 
[would] enhance rather than detract from commercial certainty”123 is incorrect. Instead, it 
creates additional burdens and complications for commercial parties in contracting.  
 
102. Westcomb124 presents a similar case with a different approach. The appellant-
remisier alleged that the respondents (being the stockbroking company and its associates) 
interfered with his relationship with his customers, and that the customers would have 
opened further accounts through him but for the actions of the respondents.  
 
103. The appellant, who worked for his company pursuant to an agency agreement,125 
obtained a customer, one Julian Sandt (“Sandt”) who opened an individual trading account 
with the appellant.
126
 This was followed by the opening of a corporate trading account by 
Sandt’s company.127  
 
104. The appellant subsequently mailed out account opening forms to Aktieninvestor, 
another firm related to Sandt.
128
 At some point, the appellant also allegedly arranged a 
meeting between his company (including some of the respondents) and Sandt and 
Aktieninvestor, where they discussed the possibility of Aktieninvestor taking up IPO 
placement shares.
129
  
 
105. When the appellant did not receive Aktieninvestor’s account opening forms after 
several months, he sought clarification from Aktieninvestor.
130
 He was informed by the 
CEO (after a long email exchange) that the forms had already been sent to one of the 
respondents, at the request of said respondent.
131
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106. According to the respondents, this was done because “Sandt was too important a 
customer for the appellant and matters such as secondary listings of shares in overseas 
markets were ‘too big’ for the appellant to handle.”132 It should also be noted that Sandt and 
Aktieninvestor had also entered into share placement and share subscription transactions 
through the respondents, none of which involved the appellant.
133
 
 
107. The appellant claimed that the respondents violated an implied duty of good faith. 
Despite significant sympathy for the appellant’s position, however, the Westcomb court 
declined to “endorse an implied duty of good faith in the Singapore context.”134  
 
108. This was a better decision than Bhasin. While it was, as the court noted, “more than 
a little odd to find a stockbroking firm competing with its own remisiers,”135 it remains the 
case that the appellant was an agent of the stockbroking firm (and by extension the 
respondents).
136
 Coming to any other conclusion would have essentially forced the firm to 
place its agent’s interests above that of its own.  
 
109. More practically, if the respondents had told the appellant that they were intercepting 
the forms, the appellant would have kicked up a ruckus and possibly damaged any 
relationship with Sandt and Aktieninvestor. 
 
110. Moreover, there was no objection to this arrangement from Aktieninvestor, who after 
all could well have insisted upon the appellant handling the account. As the email exchange 
showed, Aktieninvestor treated the appellant and respondents as one,
137
 and hence the 
account opening with one of the respondents was in line with Aktieninvestor’s expectations. 
 
111. Finally, that is not to say that the company would not suffer any repercussions from 
its behavior. As the court suggested, “it may well be the case that the situation will resolve 
itself … in so far as the reputation of that firm might result in an exodus of its remisiers,”138 
an extralegal sanction which would make sense in a low enforcement regime. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
112. Good faith as a doctrine should be approached cautiously. Allowing a general 
implication of good faith in commercial contracts, without due regard for the practical 
implications of such a change, could result in good faith becoming a catch-all doctrine, 
which contracting parties can use as a get-out-of-jail-free card. It is important to remember 
that: 
 
If one party to a contract is more shrewd, more cunning and outmanoeuvres the other 
contracting party who did not suffer a disadvantage and who was not vulnerable, it is 
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difficult to see why the latter should have greater protection than that provided by 
the law of contract.
139
  
 
While this statement was directed at contracts between “commercial leviathans,”140 there is 
no reason why this should not also apply to contracts involving corporations and/or 
reasonably sophisticated parties (within the bounds of the industry in question). 
 
113. Corporations (and their lawyers) bargain long and hard for the terms of their bargain. 
If it so happens that one side does not do as well as hoped out of the deal, or failed to 
contemplate certain outcomes therefrom, it does not follow that it should be freed from the 
consequences of the deal because of a nebulous concept of good faith. To allow this would 
be to further complicate already complicated negotiations and contracts, and create 
unnecessary burdens on parties. “Subjective, highly contextual modes of interpretation 
sacrifice transactional efficiency on the altar of subjective intention.”141 
 
114. This is not to say that there is no situation where the application of good faith would 
be useful or in the interests of justice. However, “the interests of certainty in contractual 
activity should be interfered with only when the relationship between the parties is 
unbalanced and one party is at a substantial disadvantage, or is particularly vulnerable in the 
prevailing context.”142 Companies and sophisticated parties should not generally be 
considered in those categories. To do otherwise would be to significantly undermine the 
careful work done by parties in their negotiations, and also allow other parties to “cry wolf” 
when the results do not go their way.  
 
                                                        
139
 Esso Australia Resources Pty Ltd v Southern Pacific Petroleum NL (Receivers and Managers 
Appointed) (Administrators Appointed), [2005] VSCA 228 (“Esso”) at [4]. 
140
 Ibid. 
141
 Scott, supra n 8, at 6. 
142
 Esso, supra n 137, at [4]. 
